Reserve price signaling

In a general auction model in which bidders’ signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers’ signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models.     

R＆D、R＆D溢出、内生增长和内生收敛

根据强调知识与技术创新、知识与技术溢出重要性的当代内生增长理论，本文建立了一个将R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间直接关联起来的动态模型。面板数据协整检验实证分析结果表明R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的正面长期协整关联。进一步的分析表明，R＆D与资本积累之间、R＆D与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的长期双向格兰杰因果关系。由此观知，R＆D乃长期经济增长源泉之所在。另一方面，尽管资本积累或总产出增长并不格兰杰导致R＆D溢出，证据表明R＆D溢出格兰杰导致资本积累和总产出增长。这种由R＆D溢出到资本积累和总产出增长的单向格兰杰因果关系意味着尽管知识与技术的跨国传播并非必然发生。其实为世界经济增长的重要动力。     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

我国外贸技术溢出效应的国别差异分析

技术溢出是发展中国家追赶发达国家的重要路径,溢出的渠道包括国际贸易、FDI、R＆D合作、国外R＆D投资等。我们运用经拓展后的Coe＆Helpman的贸易溢出计量模型,试图将我国从商品贸易以及FDI中所获得的技术溢出纳入同一模型中加以综合分析,并对贸易带来的技术溢出效应进行国别差异分析,以判断不同类型国家对我国吸收技术溢出效应的影响。并在此基础上,提出了相应的政策建议。     

Dynamic modelling of agricultural policies: The role of expectation schemes

The highly disputed effects of agricultural trade liberalisation are mostly simulated with static models. Our main objective in this paper is to evaluate the robustness of the static simulation results to the consistent modelling of dynamic behaviours and to the linked specification of price/return expectations. Focusing on the scenario of a complete trade liberalisation of arable crop markets by developed countries, we find that available static results are quite robust compared to dynamic specifications and to most expectation schemes. Endogenous market fluctuations due to expectation errors may appear following trade liberalisation. These fluctuations are nevertheless limited by the many feedback effects revealed by our general equilibrium framework.     

Overbidding in fixed rate tenders—an empirical assessment of alternative explanations

This paper investigates various theories explaining banks’ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.     

A general equilibrium analysis of software development: Implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement

We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.     

Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information

We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S^U(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then S^U(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e., all profiles of types have positive probability), then S^U(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G.     

Time of the essence

In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likely to happen at early stages of development and intimately connected to the degree of commitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The first-best, optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, as well as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model.